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Imagine there's no countries/It isn't hard to do 
Nothing to kill or die for/And no religion too 
Imagine all the people/Living life in peace... 
John Lennon, "Imagine" (1971) 
With the onset of belligerent nationalist propaganda in Serbia 
while it was still one of the ex-Yugoslavian republics, the process 
of reconstruct ing from above collective and, by extension, 
individual identities, was also initiated. Under the guidance of the 
new totalitarian ideology, this time of nationalist provenience and 
thorough and exclusive to the extreme, propagated by the same 
group of people formerly loyal to the communist doctrine, the 
process was all-pervasive and aggressive, devoid of any tolerance 
or understanding for the different. Ethnology, conceived a century 
ego and cherished ever since as a national discipline, at least among 
some of its "disciples", was facing yet another challenge. Based on 
her own experience, the author is rethinking once again the role of 
ethnology/anthropology at times when the discipline is expected 
to have its say. 
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The incident which has once again inspired me, this time under very real, 
immediate and serious pressure from the society at large, to rethink - both 
in terms of history and future orientations - the position, perspective, role, 
and goals of ethnology/anthropology, the discipline that has been my 
profession for over twenty years now, happened just before the turn of the 
decade. It was a time when it was evident that the long-smoldering, all-
-pervasive, and at times devastating "Yugoslav crisis" was nearing its end, 
but when it was still not entirely clear, to the majority of ordinary citizens 
and social scientists alike (cf. Bolcic 1992:11—-16) what form its final 
resolution would take. With the temporary, illusionary or real economic 
recovery (1989—1991), accompanied by the onset of the much needed 
processes of democratization, seemed to have ended "the lethargic 80s" 
and closed channels of communications between the republics. However, 
they were still open and functioning outside the official circles; and there 
was still some hope left that the art of compromising and negotiating 
might lead to a peaceful settlement of differences, whatever it might have 
been. But, it was also the time of fierce verbal and political "media civil 
wars", initiated as early as 1986 with the coverage of the first non-Albanian 
delegation from Kosovo demanding a hearing before the federal 
parliament, and in full swing by 1988, when different interpretations of the 
same events were creating a kaleidoscope of virtual realities, with one 
common denominator, however: dichotomization into "We, the imperiled 
victims" and "They, the horrendous victimizers". There is no doubt that 
there were many tangible instances when the actions of one center of 
power in terms of covert or overt intentions - provoked real fear and 
resentment among the others (cf. Denich 1993:55—56). These led to 
protective reaction which in turn set off a new wave of provocation, and 
"proof" that the "initiator" was right all along. It is also fair to say that the 
republic/state-run media, the ultimate authority in creating public opinion 
- and not just their newscasts but entire programs/contents - had a huge 
and important share in shaping the new realities, in imparting the desired 
messages primarily to their own audiences. "Special effects", achieved 
through careful bricolage, accentuation, repetition or variation of the same 
theme in different discourses (informative or pseudo-informative, political 
or pseudo-political, scientific or pseudo-scientific, economic or pseudo-
-economic, neofolkloric and other trivial paroles of popular 
entertainment), and other techniques, were designed not to inform or 
enlighten but to instill a particular world view and value system, to 
inculcate a special state of mind, to arouse definite emotions. And they 
were extremely successful in achieving their goal. With the 
operationalizatiom of the meticulously designed framework for the "data 
processing", that follows ideological binary logic, with Manichean 
polarization into the "good" and the "bad" paradigms (communist 
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 The theme of the state-controlled media and ideological instigation was a popular 
cartoon topic in the independent and opposition press. For example, in the cartoon 
"Picture in picture" by Predrag Koraksic-Corax a man is represented seated comfortably 
in his armchair in front of the TV set, calmly watching a missile approaching a house. 
What he does not realize is that this time it is not happening somewhere else but that it 
is his own house that is about to be destroyed (Corax 1992, s.p.). 
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repertoire being substituted this time by a nationalistic one), every piece of 
information was refracted through its prism, the "colors of the rainbow" 
now conveniently converted into a black-and-white projection. Without the 
controlled media it would have been extremely difficult to present abstract 
and distant ideas as "the people's will", or to achieve over a brief period of 
time such a rapid change of ethnic identities, "from a latent category to the 
eruption of nationalism that mobilized different identities against each 
other" (Denich 1993:52). By performing the assigned role the media 
indeed became highly instrumental in "forging war" throughout the 
former Yugoslavia (cf. Thompson 1995). 
My intention is not, however, to confront and compare 
performances of different power and media centers. Instead, I am merely 
focusing on one such powerful center of ideological propaganda, the one 
in Belgrade that I had experienced first hand, which also happened to be 
the originator of the campaign soon to be followed, mutatis mutandis, by 
others (Ibid.:51ff)- Its state-run media, and especially television, the 
omnipotent "magic box", were not only the sole reference for "politically 
correct" reasoning and behavior, but seem to have themselves been the 
very creators of life and thought. Nothing seemed to have really happened 
unless it had received proper media coverage. Many a time I have 
witnessed people hurrying home from an event they had actively 
participated in (a political rally, demonstration, signing a petition, etc.) to 
see its televised representation and find out what had "really happened". 
What counted were not the events as such, but their media 
reinterpretation. 1 And the media knew well how to take advantage of this 
mass "television addiction". Numerous events were deliberately staged so 
that their footage would impart a message favorable for cosa nostra, while 
those which were spontaneous, undesirable, or enacted by the opposition, 
were interpreted in a discrediting way. For the same scheme developed to 
distinguish the Nation and its Enemies - in the case of Serbia the latter 
category included almost the entire world population - was also applied 
"inside" the Nation, differentiating the True from the False, the "patriots" 
from the "traitors". 
In such an atmosphere any public act or statement could have easily 
been abused in the "differentiating process" or in building "our case". That 
is why the invitation I received in a telephone call from a well-known 
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documentary film-maker - and I have no reason whatsoever to believe that 
his intentions were anything but genuine and sincere - not only startled 
me, but also started a train of thought about my own profession under new 
and ever so different circumstances. The gentleman in question was 
initiating a campaign by collecting signatures from individuals of "public 
esteem and merit" in support of a demand to exhume the victims of the 
World War II genocide from their unmarked burial place, located in some 
cave in the Krajina region, known only to the local population. The 
initiator believed that with the Communist conspiratorial, hushful policy 
about the past interethnic hostilities in the name of "brotherhood and 
unity" finally being over, it was time to undo the historic injustice, 
recognize the victims and give them a decent public religious funeral, and 
consequently turn the place into a shrine worthy of pilgrimage. Under 
different c i rcumstances , the proposal would certainly deserve 
consideration. For, although some historic events may be temporally 
submerged, even erased from memory or reinterpreted to suit the current 
political and ideological goals, they never entirely vanish. They still 
remain as facts and there is always a possibility that they may hauntingly 
reappear in the future. After all, it would be a pledge to democracy and 
liberalism and a healthy, unburdened new start to deal with the "ghosts of 
the past"; to accept the responsibility for the horrendous deeds committed 
by one section of the population during war years, just as Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl had done in his speech celebrating the unification of 
Germany in 1990 (Marcridis 1992:197). But, if it were to lead to a 
genuine act of forgiveness it would have to be initiated by the "guilty 
party", not demanded by the "victimized side". In addition, equally 
important, it would also require the readiness of the latter side to admit 
without reservations that civilians belonging to other ethnic groups did 
also fall victim to its own extremists, and to refrain from playing the 
"numbers game", considerably exaggerating its World War II losses as if 
realistic estimates were not bad enough. (Equally deceiving and pointless, 
of course, was the deliberate decreasing of the same numbers by the 
opposite side). Instead, its own losses, together with deliberate emphasis 
only on the history of conflicts and hostilities in the common overall 
historic experience, had become "the central theme of contemporary 
Serbian nationalism" (Djilas 1996:24). 
On the other hand, a call for a religious ceremony in the given time 
frame and context had additional, similar connotations and therefore also 
advised caution. As soon as the pressure of public religious expression had 
been released, had not religious affiliations already been made 
instrumental in national homogenization processes, and religious 
differences exploited in demarcating ethnicities and arousing animosities 
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2 A n d r e j Šimić has even quoted "two seemingly innocuous events" dating from the early 
1980s - the appearance of the Holy Virgin near Međugorje, and, after almost half a 
century, continuance of the work on the completion of the St. Sava, the largest Eastern 
Orthodox Church in Europe, located in the center of Belgrade - as "portents of the 
future, harbingers of the current Yugoslav chaos" (Šimić 1993:16). 
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 Dunja Rihtman-Auguštin focused her analysis on Croatian ethnology, but it is fair to 
say that many of her conclusions are also valid for ethnology/anthropology in Serbia, 
although they grew from different "schools" (the ethnology of Antun Radić as opposed 
to the folklore of V. Stefanović-Karadžić and the anthropogeography and mentality 
studies of Jovan Cvijić), and in some respects followed different research interests. For 
instance, contrary to Croatian ethnology, ethnogenesis was one of the popular topics in 
Serbia, but it was conceived as a replica of the Soviet ethnic theories which did not 
really help in illuminating either past or current ethnic processes. Actually, general 
theories were schematically applied to describe processes spanning centuries. These was 
no serious "ethnogenetic" empirical research conducted for decades after World War II. 
Therefore, I strongly agree with D. Rihtman-Auguštin's criticism and caution regarding 
such an approach to ethnic studies expressed in the same. In the mid-80s, however, 
when it became evident that ethnicity is not an antiquated category belonging to pre-
-modern times, but an important factor in current socio-political reality, researchers 
"rediscovered" ethnic studies as their par excellence domain. Western theories 
combined with extensive fieldwork are now the alternative orientation to the "old-
-style" ethnogenesis. 
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among them? 2 Seen from this perspective, the combination of Nation, 
victims, territories marked by graves and memories, tradition and religion, 
all part and parcel of traditional nationalism and corresponding building 
of collective ethnic identity, the proposal was all wrong. 
In addition, my inviter informed me, as an intended flattery and a 
strong argument in favor of my consent, that my name had been chosen 
from so many candidates because I was an ethnologist, a woman and a 
mother (in fact, all the signatoriess were to be women). Paradoxically, 
although I had lived and worked in a socialist country, this was the very 
first time that I had been asked to perform a "public duty" because of my 
profession, and as incredible as it may sound, because of my gender and 
confirmed procreative capability. For, although it goes without saying that 
even under the former Yugoslav "soft" version of socialism, some 
restrictions imposed from "above" or resulting from self-censorship did 
apply to ethnological research as well (cf. Rihtman-Augustin 1992:81 — 
— 89) , 3 there were no strict directions to follow, or prescribed "duties to 
perform" outside those imposed by professional ethics. As in all other 
spheres of public life, the sole restriction was for "national science" to stay 
away from the taboo issues of ethnic nationalism. (Let us not forget the 
trouble some foreign researchers had to face during the 1970s, arousing 
suspicion simply because they worked in tri-ethnic regions such as 
Bosnia). This was the road to follow only if one desired to join the ranks 
of "dissidents", as many intellectuals and politicians were "labeled", some 
of whom were even prosecuted and expelled from the Party and fired 
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Although many foreign anthropologists have conducted research in Serbia since World 
War II, the contacts established with domestic ethnologists never really exceeded casual 
collegial relations. Contrary to Croatia, there were no joint research projects or 
publications or any other forms of formal collaboration. The reason for this "parallel 
existence" with paths rarely crossing each other lies in the very wide gap that had 
existed between the two disciplines. Ethnologists, entrapped in the conservatism and 
traditionalism of their discipline still ruled by the XIX century Romanticism, were 
obsessed with the past and the necessity to register all those aspects of the "folk life", 
still believed to originate frwm "times immemorial", doomed to perish in face of the 
advent of modernization. Reconstruction of the image of idealized village life was the 
ultimate goal. Therefore, they were constantly and painstakingly in search of the new 
data confirming the old assumptions. Cultural and social processes that were evolving 
right before their eyes were only sporadically and partially of any interest to them. It 
was believed that such topics should be covered by sociology, while their role was to 
preserve the bygones. It is no wonder then that foreign anthropologists relied more on 
their communication and collaboration with the sociologists than with the "old style" 
ethnologists (ProSid-Dvornic 1993:43 —48). 
The work of Dunja Rihtman-Augustin, her insightful research and discussions on 
contemporary culture, stressing that there are ethnologically relevant phenomena 
everywhere around us not only in pre-modern village life, her criticism of the cultural-
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from their j obs and posi t ions. Otherwise , in all fairness, e thnologis ts were 
free to pursue their chosen top ics , theoret ical or ienta t ions and research 
methods w h i c h resu l ted in p ronounced ec lec t ic i sm. This was especia l ly 
true from the early 1970s on, w h e n in the era of general l iberalization and 
opening up of the count ry to var ious influences - the na t ional i sm of the 
70s was a l so a "child" of l ibera l i sm - there was a g rowing n u m b e r of 
in te l lec tua ls of M a r x i s t and o ther o r i e n t a t i o n s , wel l i n fo rmed a b o u t 
contemporary ideas , t rends , movements and processes in the Wes t , w h o in a 
r emarkab ly o p e n w a y a r t i cu la ted the i r k n o w l e d g e as c r i t i c i sm of the 
exist ing social sys tem. Th i s was the rebel l ion of the "educated minor i ty" 
against all "great totali tarian ideologies". 
T h e younge r genera t ion of e thno log i s t s , soc ia l ized and educa t ed 
under very di f ferent c i r c u m s t a n c e s from those that p reva i l ed in the 
pos twar yea r s , began its o w n professional "emancipa t ion" at abou t the 
same t ime by cha l leng ing pract ical ly every th ing wi thin the scope of the 
t radi t ional d i sc ip l ine . In f luenced by wes te rn l i t e ra tu re , con tac t s wi th 
fo re ign a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s a n d the i r w o r k , and by o t h e r far m o r e 
theoretically advanced social sciences in their own mi l ieu , 4 they could not 
have been satisfied wi th the a theore t i ca l , a t empora l descr ip t ion of the 
vague category of "folk", the quintessence of national e thnology. Ins tead, 
this more or less successfully self-reeducated generat ion chose to explore 
entirely new pa rad igms of research , theoret ica l ly g rounded and focused 
on cul ture , its mean ings and functions, processes , dynamics of change , on 
real life that could be exper ienced either first hand while conduct ing field 
work , or from the re levant sources dat ing from the relevant t ime pe r iod . 5 
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-historical ethnology, and her careful reading and sharing of comments on literature not 
yet discovered at home, were quite influential and inspirational in Serbia as well. 
6 T h e analysis of two independent sources of information, essays written by candidates 
for enrollment at the Department as part of their classifying exams, and responses to a 
poll taken from freshmen to senior year students, reveal that the majority of the 
candidates (73.7%) still bore the colloquial concept of ethnology and gave descriptive 
definitions enumerating topics covered by the discipline (customs and beliefs, magic, 
religion, folklore, kinship and social structure, material culture, origin and evolution of 
cultures, ethnic groups, nations, ethnic characteristics of communities). Later on their 
opinions change, become more elaborate, but they still reflect duality of orientations as 
well as some confusion as to the discipline's basic concepts (Prosic-Dvornic 1992:256, 
261—262) . 
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Confrontational attitudes about the "right way of doing ethnology", and 
discrepancies between these two orientations were so deep that they 
actually came to represent two different disciplines or subdisciplines, 
originating from two different socio-cultural, political and intellectual 
traditions, Central/Eastern European and Western, respectively (cf. e.g. 
Halpern, Hammel 1969): "archeo-ethnology" (Sklevicky 1991), on the 
one side, and modern ethnology or cultural anthropology, on the other. 
The reason for renaming the Department of Ethnology into the 
Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the University of 
Belgrade in 1990 was conditioned by this duality of paradigms, the 
existence of which was in fact legitimized in this way. 
This "revolution" within the discipline would not have been possible 
had there been any serious grip or control, which itself testifies to the 
existence of a considerable degree of intellectual freedom after the late 
60s and early 70s. However, if a battle had been won and a truce signed 
inside the discipline, it still did not mean that modern ethnology was also 
victorious in the war for its affirmation, respect and influence in the 
society at large. The colloquial perception of ethnology as the "science 
about the folk" 6 has barely changed (anthropology was more associated 
with literary criticism, sociology, psychology). Ethnologists were still seen 
as experts on the Folk, Tradition, and every single detail of antiquated 
village life. At the time of "national revival", "return to one's own roots" 
and "natural order", presented as the "remedy to all evils", ethnology could 
have experienced an inversion of its status. Its subject matter and its 
approach to traditional culture were regarded as irrelevant, impractical, 
archaic, anachronous, or "exotic" at best, by "progressive scientific 
socialism". The latter was hostile to all traditions existing before its advent 
to power, and prone to retrogressive reinterpretation of history as means of 
its own legitimization ("avant nous le deluge"). This resulted in 
ethnology's marginal both scientific and social positions, but could the re-
inauguration of "national values" mean a privileged place for the old-style 
"folk science" as well? Its vast body of meticulous descriptions of customs, 
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folklore, costumes, and all other aspects of folk culture, perceived as vitally 
important yet regretfully forgotten, could serve as a "repository" of 
cultural knowledge, as ready-made models of thought, behavior, even 
complete life styles that could be easily revitalized. More importantly, its 
knowledge of migrations, spatial ethnic distributions, ethnogenetic 
processes and ethnic history could provide proof and justification for the 
new border re-demarcation of the aspired, greater nation-state. And last 
but certainly not least, the key concepts on which the ethnological research 
paradigm is based, such as "ethnos" or "folk", "tradition", "ethno/national 
identity", were suddenly both sacred and common words abundantly used 
in everyday life, and heavily abused in polito-nationalistic ideological 
discourse. 
One of the great advantages of these key concepts for 
propagandistic ends is that they are all very general, vague, polyvalent, 
fluid, and opaque notions, neutral in themselves yet often ideologized. 
However, these very qualities make them susceptible to numerous 
manipulations of their meanings outside of scientific discourse, by any 
social group or movement powerful enough to "pour" and force into 
acceptance their own myths and values as these notions' content, in the 
process of transposing them from abstract to more concrete ideas (cf. 
Hobsbawm 1990:6). The problem with this procedure is that these notions 
are never concretized in science and elsewhere, as they should be, as a 
series of transient historic realities materialized and valid in certain specific 
time-space frameworks, and as the expression of a particular Zeitgeist. An 
example would be the meaning of the Volk in German Romanticism and 
its subsequent transformations, or definition of ethnicity as a static 
primordial and "divine" category, as opposed to its perception as a 
dynamic, contextualized process, etc. Instead, they represent an ideological 
construction built on a biased selection of elements from the entirety in 
question and proclaimed to be ultimate truths. In addition, they can all be 
easily emotionally charged and triggered off to produce the desired 
mood. 
This new Truth, combining all these notions and others of the same 
order, was the Truth of the new wave of nationalism (or chauvinistic 
nationalism). As an ideology, it represents a continuation of past 
nationalistic movements, specifically, in the case of Serbia, of traditional 
nationalism "that sought its source in the past and was portrayed as a 
natural phenomenon, not an act of political will" (Marcridis 1992:196). 
The latter was the case with liberal nationalism responsible for nationally 
heterogeneous Grossstatenbildung motivated by economic profitability. 
The former, to the contrary, in the Rousseauistic and Herderian manner, 
stresses the emotional and spiritual unity of the community of people - the 
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existence of which is willed by God, and hence of divine origin - who 
share the same ancestors (blood ties), religion, language, cultural tradition, 
historic experience, territory. According to the same ideology, each of 
these traits is worthy of living or dying for, and their protection, for the 
sake of the entity's well-being without which there is no individual, is the 
sacred duty of every member of the community. In t imes of 
overwhelming crises and pending total disaster, or of attempts to recover 
what had been formerly lost, or, rephrased, of aspired expansionism and 
subsequent unification, the notion may become arrogantly extreme and 
militant, demanding maximal gains. The desired territories become all 
those lands that used to be conquered by the state at the most glorious 
periods of its history. Also included are those territories in its vicinity 
inhabited by the Nation's emigrants and where they have been or still are 
the majority, the evidence of which is the existence of their graves, other 
cultural remains and memories (historic and ethnic claims combined and 
condensed in the latest slogan "All Serbs in a single state"). As a 
concession to boosting confidence and morale - much needed in 
depressing times of crises - the entity is further presented not as an equal 
but as superior to all others which are, in addition, blamed for all wrongs 
within the Nation. Their recognition as "sinful and evil" justifies their 
destruction, and ultimately, a "healthy" Nation, is an "ethnically clean" 
Nation. 
Once the notion of Nation (ethnicity, folk, ethnic identity) was 
chosen, the content of Tradition was also "filled" accordingly. Again, 
borrowing from the previous phase of nation-building (that of the XIX 
century) and its profusive patriotic rhetoric and extensive mythology -
- there were in fact ready-made templates that could be reactivated. They 
centered around the elaborate (in terms of general ideology, eschatology, 
ethics, motivation, role models, etc.), sacred but also rather macabre legend 
of the Battle of Kosovo, that was transmitted in folkloric form from one 
generation to another, even during the socialist period, in private if not to 
the fullest in the public sphere (cf. Popovic" 1976; Trebjegnjanin 
1989:113-117; Colovic 1993:93ff.). Yet Tradition was still very different 
in form, content and especially context. For, this time, the scheme was 
further reduced, mythologized, neofolklorized, emphasizing primarily the 
heroic patriarchal ethos, and as a net result, bringing about reactionary 
archaism, megalomania, xenophobia, isolationism and violence (war 
subculture) as the predominating components of world view (DragiCevid-
-Sesic 1994:183ff; ProSic-Dvornic 1996). In this newly evaluated, 
reconstructed instrumentalized and "retouched" version of Tradition, all its 
other faces opposing or denying its simplistic nature, were, naturally, 
erased. There was no mention of the constant and tenacious struggle for 
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democracy, modernization, cosmopolitanism, a respectable place in the 
family of nations, all simultaneously existing during the XIX century, as 
opposed to populism (narodnjastvo), of high culture following the trends 
of the epoch, or emancipated urban ways contrasting the patriarchal 
model. Even the once highly favored ideas of Yugoslavism were now 
pinned to someone else, again as an act of conspiracy against the Serbian 
being. The multi-national unity within a democratic federation, that 
counter-balanced the idea of Greater Serbia, resurrected again after the 
dream of restoring a communist, Yugoslavia centralized and dominated by 
a Serbian leader had turned into a nightmare. And finally, the 
international political context was very different. While ideas of creating 
greater states (irredentism) were flourishing in many parts of XIX century 
Europe, today 's rules of the game have considerably changed. In 
contemporary Europe after the fall of Communism, guided by 
ethnonationalism, the Wilsonian principle of self-determination and 
statehood is being applied there where it had left off after the World War I 
and the breakdown of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. 
Germany being the only exception, all other new states were created 
through separatism (multiplication of number instead of aggrandizement 
of the few), and although there were demands for border changes, only 
former interior demarcations have been recognized and legalized by the 
international community. Where that had not been the case, the answer was 
war for "blood and territory". 
It is not hard to deduce why this particular and extremely powerful 
ideology, state-run and populist at the same time, was chosen as a response 
to the overwhelming crisis in Serbia at the end of the century. From the 
regime's point of view it provided more advantages than it entailed 
dangers. The atemporal mythical model of thought and action, based on 
stereotypes, cliches and prejudices, which shifted politics into myth and 
history, into "Tradition", simple, comprehensive, and compensating for the 
deficiencies of reality, was spread like a net over the reigning chaos 
creating the illusion of ordered world. The group and its leader, potent 
enough to create such an illusion, no matter how temporary, could also 
hope for its quick legitimization and mass homogenization loyally and 
unconditionally to back its goals. From the totalitarian point of view, 
substituting nationalist ideology for that of class, was also an advantage. 
For again it was based on collective identity, demanding sacrifice "from all 
for all", which conveniently meant that all individual interests and civil 
rights could be indefinitely postponed. Anyone asking for them was 
nothing but a traitor. And finally, nationalism proved to be extremely 
instrumental in pivoting into calmer, controllable waters serious social 
discontent and protest of the mid-80s which demanded radical reforms 
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Contrary to these pathetic proclamations presented as "recipes" for good behavior 
(several role models were created and media-promoted - woman-mother, woman-warrior, 
etc.), women and their real sufferings in life have been terribly abused and manipulated, 
as for example, the politicization of the rape issue (it is always Our women who are 
raped, and the rapists are always from Their ranks). Instances of domestic violence, 
tremendously increasing since the beginning of the war, were, on the other hand, 
conveniently hushed up. Equally hypocritical was the changed attitude towards a 
woman's autonomous right to bear or not to bear a child. As a consequence of the 
monstrous conviction that all problems would be easier to solve if the nation exhibited 
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and even entire change of the system. The ambivalent features of the "anti-
-bureaucratic" revolution, social and nationalist at the same time, again 
staged "from above" by the victorious faction of the Communist (later 
renamed the Socialist) Party of Serbia in response to the unrest "from 
below", were the liminal phase of the political ritual, designed to prevent 
change of the system and its ruling nomenclature, rather than promote its 
transition. Nationalism also proved to be a "smart choice" as a medium for 
ideological persuasion. In addition to all the mentioned advantages, 
among a people restricted or forbidden from expressing national cultural 
identity and "remembering" its history during socialism proper, it 
appeared to be a substantiation of regained freedom. 
Within the given framework, read from the only appropriate 
nationalistic key, the invitation I have received reveals its full meaning. Not 
only as a professional dealing with ethnicity, national identity and 
traditional cultural content, but also as a mother, my public appeal for a 
duty to be performed would additionally invest the proposal with 
ostensible authority. My participation as an ethnologist would verify the 
legitimacy of the concepts and deeds, and my personal and private 
identities, all of a sudden turned into a public issue, mingled and 
juxtaposed in a novel and uncomfortable way stemming from nationalistic 
and patriarchal world view and definition of gender roles, would also be 
there to prove a point. The subordinate female was expected anew 
unconditionally to support the system by performing her traditional roles 
and duties, this time additionally justified as being for the good of the 
Nation (cf. A. Milic 1994): looking after the home and family, bearing 
and raising children, especially sons, caring for the weak, the sick, the old, 
and the dead (public grief and private bereavement, as well as the funeral 
and post funeral rituals in Serbian traditional culture are, par excellence, 
the woman's domain) or, in specific situations for the wounded, refugees 
and orphans of war. In other words, her public duty was seen as the 
extension of her traditional private domain. As a match to the heroic men 
of her culture, she also had to be brave, and ready for sacrifice and 
suffering as part of her destiny, for no price is high to pay for the 
Fatherland, for the defense of its sacred soil. 7 
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sufficient biological growth, increase in natality has become a deep concern of the 
"conscious" part of the society. At inordinate times even outrageous proposals for the 
birth rate increase can receive public attention. Namely, the well-known artist, Milic 
Stankovic (od Macve), a "genuine" nationalist from the early 1960s, then pleading for 
"national artistic expression" and now also a mystic, poet (he authored versed "Curse of 
America"), activist (his latest endeavor is the Committee for the Defense of Serbs from 
the Hague Tribunal), not only supports "natality policy" but also claims that he has 
discovered a formula which enables even women well beyond menopause to have 
children. "I estimated that in five-and-a half years, in three cycles of mass procreation, 
we could have a 7.5 million population increase... After that... we will need a greater 
territory to live on, and here is our chance to regain the land seized from us by the 
Atlantic Pact (NIN, Weekly Informative Magazine, no. 2377, June 17, '96, 19). The same 
artist has ventured into ethnogenetic analyses. According to his theory, Serbs (Sorabs) 
originate from the Central Danubian Plain and the Balkans, and they represent the 
initial tribe from which all others have stemmed. They are the Navel of the Planet, The 
Poker of the World, Catena Mundi! 
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The irony was that when the subjects covered by ethnology finally 
received publicity, bringing it out of decades long anonymity, it could not 
feel triumphant and rejoice in the fact, but rather had to face new 
challenges. Could it afford to stay neutral at a time of aggressive 
politicking of its basic concepts, mutilated by reduction, oversimplification 
and tendentious interpretation, although engaging in polemics would 
mean consenting to the "double register" discussion: poli t ico-
-propagandistic as opposed to scientific discourse? At times of roaring 
passion, the calm voice of reason would only fall on deaf ears. Basically it 
had two choices. It could again chose to refrain from studying the actual 
processes that could be witnessed by participant observation and dedicate 
itself to the research of some "neutral" topics from the past (e.g. types of 
footwear or pottery, or spring ritual cycle in some localized area). Thus, it 
could hope to avoid either a confrontational or apologetic relation with the 
authorities (now, after the new wave of etatism, also acting as employers 
and financiers). The other and only option, according to the majority, was 
to "take arms against the sea of trouble" and meticulously monitor, register 
and interpret the current phenomena and ongoing processes. Ethnology 
could finally take the responsibility of making a positive contribution by 
informing the community about itself in a critical, unbiased way. And 
reliable information is the only sound substance that can counter-balance 
the euphoric warmongering in the name of Nation and Tradition, and fill 
in the void that will be left after yet another ideology is used up. 
Serious research, theoretically founded and based on reliable 
sources of information, should continue to be simultaneously conducted at 
different time segments. The only way to demystify vague concepts liable 
to ideologization, and hence to manipulation and instrumentalization, is to 
fill them in with real, historically datable, and spatially defined contents 
from relevant time periods. Instead of reconstructing timeless images of 
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the idealized past, efforts should be directed towards unveiling inserts of 
real life, constantly experiencing, besides the processes of long duration, 
those of discontinuity and transition, of conflict and anxiety, along with 
harmony and security. Paradoxically, the old-style ethnology has created 
its picture of ideal village life based mainly on the material dating from 
the latter half of the XIX and the first half of the XX centuries, the time 
span characterized by intensive, radical and rapid transformations, which 
did indeed deeply affect the peasants as well (formation of the 
independent nation-state, market economy, property laws, taxation, 
political divisions, national liberation wars, compulsory schooling, etc.). 
Ethnology is therefore obliged not only to reinterpret and contextualize 
the collected data, but also to reveal its own past ideological delusions 
(Romanticism, populism, nationalism), not as deliberate manipulations but 
as the reflection of socialization under specific Zeitgeist. 
The historical anthropological studies that I am pleading for, are 
however, only one side of the coin. The other is reserved for the research 
of the complex present. All of Eastern Europe, and the Balkans in 
particular, have recently become a living laboratory offering what is 
probably an unprecedented plenitude of topics for anthropological 
investigation. Living and observing under present conditions also has a 
retroactive benefit: it helps one to realize the full complexity of processes 
in the past as well, and to reformulate questions and focus attention on a 
wider variety of events while rereading historic sources. On the other hand, 
knowledge of past activities or similar processes in other socio-cultural 
systems, as a "control sample", provides better insights into current events 
and enables a researcher to detect a pattern within the overwhelming, 
speedily evolving reality. However, it is also true that many of these events 
can be "perceived, traced and interpreted only afterwards" (Rihtman-
-Augustin 1992a:41). 
In the meantime, the work of observing and data collecting has to be 
seriously undertaken. Of course every ethnologist/anthropologist will find 
his/her own topic and angle of perception, but some themes seem to 
impose themselves , demanding thorough and urgent at tention. 
National/ethnic identity, with its radical change over the past decade, is 
certainly one of them. How was such a change involving intolerance, 
intense hatred, the urge for distruction, proneness to atrocious behavior, at 
all possible? Was it because the "historic animosities" that have been kept 
firmly under cover during authoritarian socialist rule had gained 
extraordinary power while latent and then exploded with unpredictable 
force once the grip was released? Was it the necessary by-product of 
democratization, or did it, to the contrary, erupt because of its very lack or 
fragility in the early phases? Personally, I am more inclined to believe that 
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national indoctrination of the particular type, together with its Manichean 
world view and the perception and acceptance of The Leader as an all-
mighty patriarch, was successful at least not only because of the power of 
the newly released ethnic sentiments, but rather because of the 
continuation and persistence of thinking within the framework of binary 
logic (cf. Benovska-Subkova 1995:173) . Not only can the 
dichotomization into WE (positive ascription - divination) and THEY 
(negative description - demonization) be attributed to the traditional 
(magico-religious) way of thinking, but also to conspiratorial communist 
ideology. In other words, the minds of the recipients were conditioned 
over the last fifty years to ideological, ready-made, simplified explanations 
. The aftereffect of conforming to the paternalistic attitudes is social 
(political, economic) infantilism: "suppression of each spontaneous 
initiative of the individual who thereby becomes incapable of independent 
action expecting someone else to take over the care and responsibility for 
him" (Ibid.: 166). If such were the case, there would be no simpler and 
more effective procedure than to substitute one ideology for another. 
Building-up (or reconfirming) ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries 
in interaction with other such groups, and transposing polito-socio-
-economic claims into ethnic grievances is a self-evident process calling 
for close anthropological monitoring. However, inter-ethnic relations 
among Serbs from different parts of the former Yugoslavia also deserve 
full attention. Are they really one ethnic group with the same aspirations 
and loyalties, ready to live in one state, or do they not only considerably 
differ from one another but also exhibit opposing, confrontational views? 
We know of the adaptation problems the "colonists" experienced after 
moving from the Dinaric regions to Serbia Proper and its former 
autonomous provinces. We are also aware of the cultural differences that 
caused misunderstandings in the past, and that the "autochthonous" 
population was often resentful because of the colonists' privileges and 
aggressive imposition of their own ways. The Serbs from Bosnia have 
expressed their disgust with the people from Serbia because of their 
reluctant attitudes towards fighting the war for the Fatherland (failed 
mobilizations etc.). As for the authorities, while the Serbs in the diaspora 
were very "tons a inumirer", they were not as welcome once they had 
changed their status to refugees in the homeland. 
The economy and social structure represent further realms of 
interest for anthropological research. After all, a total collapse of the 
economy does not happen all that often in history. We have seen the 
thriving of the black market, the gray economy, criminalization of export-
import trading brought about by both external (UN Security Council 
Resolution 757 on Yugoslavia) and internal sanctions, war profiteering, but 
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also state executed "relocation of resources", to put it euphemistically, 
through a series of machinations. The prolonged period of shortages and 
deprivation, followed by pathological social stratification, were also 
favorable for the novel wave of flourishing of alternative social structures 
based on ascriptive and personal relationships, and the accompanying 
forms of traditional reciprocity, as an existential necessity. Ethnologists 
can not even complain that their "classic topics" have disappeared from 
life, or that the study of everyday living has lost its attraction. 
And finally, there is still one key concept left to be filled with proper 
meaning: the notion of "Folk". If the notion is to apply to the majority of 
the population, the vast category of peasant-urbanites who had flooded the 
cities after World War II, as well as that of partially urbanized villagers - a 
blend between the neofolkloric adherents and hommo sovieticus 
("passivity, waiting for state handouts, loose labor discipline, little respect 
for the law, etc." - Mokrzycki 1992:134) - can we really claim that we 
understand them, that we are truly familiar with their value systems and 
that we can predict their actions? While in the past, professionals have 
exhausted their interest by either rebuking their culture as a "distortion, 
degradation and contamination of the 'pure' traditional culture", or by 
generously recognizing its existence guided by the postmodern appraisal 
of the "different", they have grown into a powerful and numerous group 
that has overwhelmed all other cultural (social, political) expressions. For, 
it was "the folk" that was most susceptible to "nationalization", most eager 
to promote and celebrate the new reality, as well as to turn ideas into deeds 
v 
and to gain profits out of its "kitsch patriotism" (cf. M. Dragiëevié-SeSic" 
1 8 3 - 2 0 7 ) . 
Although the field is so rich for anthropological investigation and 
for insightful learning about so many important issues, it should not be 
expected, contrary to sociology or psychology, to provide practical 
solutions to specific problems. An anthropologist/ethnologist is not really 
fit to perform "le rôle du conseiller du prince"; being "le fou du roi" is 
more in his line. If he/she cannot offer readily applicable expertise to 
particularities, he/she, a student of myth and symbol, more than 
compensates that deficiency by being able to unveil the myths and power 
invested in authorities. "Pour l'ethnologie, en définitive, le défi de 
l'indépendance n'est que celui de son existence" (Gossiaux 1992:220). 
Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever for ethnologists to feel 
"powerless" because they have not been - but for a few examples -
- consulted in designing and carrying out national(istic) propaganda, or 
actively participated as "applied ethnologists" in solving current problems. 
Their "power" actually stems from that very abstinence. 
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R E K O N S T R U K C I J A IDENTITETA I ULOGA N A C I O N A L N E 
ETNOLOGIJE: P R O M A T R A N J E IZDALEKA ILI A K T I V N O 
S U D J E L O V A N J E 
SAŽETAK 
Pojavom nacionalističke i militantne propagande u Srbiji, u doba dok je još bila jedna od 
republika bivše Jugoslavije, počeo j e i proces rekonstrukcije skupnog, a i individualnih 
identiteta. Vođen novom totalitarističkom ideologijom, ovoga puta nacionalističkoga 
podrijetla, do krajnosti posvemašnje i isključive, a propagirane od istih ljudi koji su 
prethodno bili odani komunističkoj doktrini, proces je bio sveobuhvatan i agresivan, 
lišen ikakve snošljivosti ili razumijevanja drukčijega. Etnologija, začeta prije jednoga 
stoljeća i otad čuvana barem od nekih svojih "učenika", stavljena j e kao nacionalna 
disciplina pred novi izazov. Bi li trebala slijediti svoju vlastitu tradiciju sudjelovanja u 
stvaranju nacije, ovaj puta prema pravilima koje donosi trenutni poredak, ili bi umjesto 
toga trebala imati hrabrosti "plivati uz rijeku" i promatrati , bilježiti i interpretirati 
procese u tijeku s položaja "neutralne znanosti"? Za one koji nisu morali ponijeti teret 
svoje vlastite ideologizirane struke ili rada u totalitarističkome okružju ovo nikako neće 
predstavljati dvojbu stoga što bi za njih posljednji izbor bio i jedini. Međutim, u doba 
euforije kad je sve polarizirano između krajnosti, "rodoljublja" i "izdaje", izbor se može 
učiniti mnogo složenijim. Autorica na osnovi vlastitoga iskustva još jednom promišlja 
ulogu etnologije/antropologije u vremenima kad se od nje očekuje da preuzme riječ. 
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